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Binding the Will: George Eliot and
the Practice of Promising
BY MELISSA J. GANZ

Scholars have long noted George Eliot’s interest in the nature and
limits of the human will, but they have paid little attention to her treatment of the practice of promising.1 In The Mill on the Floss (1860),
Middlemarch (1871–1872), and Daniel Deronda (1876), promises
give rise to repeated conflicts and misunderstandings, crystallizing
the tension between freedom and obligation that runs through Eliot’s
work. The disputes typically occur in one of two ways. Egoists such
as Tom Tulliver and Edward Casaubon attempt to pressure others
into making promises that require them to act in self-defeating ways.
Individuals such as Stephen Guest, Rosamond Vincy, and Gwendolen
Harleth, by contrast, refuse to honor their own commitments, evincing
a complete disregard for the ways in which other people construe their
words and actions. Underlying both of these problems is a profound
abuse of will and an unwillingness to consider other people’s feelings
and perspectives.
Outside the world of Eliot’s novels, moral philosophers, jurists, and
social thinkers devoted considerable attention to the conflict between
the individual will and the claims of others in the formation and interpretation of promises. Philosophers had been debating the nature
and source of promissory obligations since at least the seventeenth
century. Natural law thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf,
Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke considered promises to be naturally
binding; in their view, promises derived their force from people’s wills
and intentions. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
however, philosophers’ ideas about promises began to change. Utilitarian thinkers such as William Paley and John Austin now located the
source of promissory obligations in people’s expectations, privileging
the reasonable interpretations of promisees over the actual intentions
of promisors.2
At about the same time, jurists began to consider the nature of promissory obligations as they reformulated the law of contract. Whereas
judges previously interpreted contracts in ways that affirmed communal
understandings of fair exchange, now they sought to give effect only to
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commitments that people freely and deliberately made. The new “will
theory” of contract drew heavily upon natural law philosophy; according to this theory, individual promises, wills, and intentions themselves
gave rise to contractual obligations. Judges, in fact, began to speak of
a contract as a “meeting of minds.”3 In practice, however, they found
it very difficult to uncover the intentions of contracting parties. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, most judges had come to embrace an
objective approach to contractual interpretation, relying upon external
manifestations of intention as did utilitarian philosophers.4
In this essay, I read Eliot’s treatment of promises in the context of
these changing ideas about consensual obligations, shedding light on
questions that were important in her own time and that remain of
deep interest to philosophers and legal scholars today. In doing so, I
contribute to a debate among literary critics about the nature of Eliot’s
ethical vision. A number of scholars have argued that Eliot’s novels
fail to sustain the ideal of sympathetic relationships that the texts
ostensibly espouse. These critics highlight the ways in which egoism,
gender relations, and the indeterminacy of language undermine the
fellow-feeling that Eliot seeks to promote.5 A close analysis of Eliot’s
treatment of promises, however, suggests her strong commitment to an
intersubjective model of human relationships. Like Paley, Austin, and
Henry Sidgwick, and like a growing number of jurists in the middle
of the nineteenth century, Eliot embraces an expansive conception
of promises: she suggests that one becomes bound by a promise
whenever one knowingly excites another’s expectations concerning
the existence of an obligation, even though one does not intend to
become bound. The willingness to abide by implicit promises and to
honor the expectations that one raises in other minds is a crucial test
of moral character in Eliot’s fiction. At the heart of this definition of
promises lies Eliot’s belief in the importance of attending to the ways
in which one’s words and actions affect other people.
Although Eliot privileges external manifestations of intention over
actual intentions in assessing promissory responsibility, she remains
committed to the notion that a meeting of minds ought, ideally, to
form the basis of agreements and exchanges. As a practical matter,
that is, she recognizes the difficulty of discerning others’ intentions,
and she shows the need to honor the expectations that one knowingly
creates in other minds; but she holds out the possibility that people
may achieve a real blending of wills and desires. Eliot articulates this
utopian vision of promising in the Jewish plot of her final novel. In the
religious visionary Mordecai Cohen’s relationship with the eponymous
566
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Daniel Deronda, she imagines a meeting of minds, highlighting the
ways in which promises can both reflect and promote understanding
between people. She acknowledges, though, that such a mingling of
ideas and intentions is, in the world of nineteenth-century England,
limited to men.
i.

By the late eighteenth century, promises had come to play a crucial
role in many areas of social life, from commercial exchanges to conjugal
relations. In all of these areas, they raised pressing questions about the
nature of intention, interpretation, and obligation. The questions arose
most persistently, however, in the law courts. Jurists found themselves
grappling with the ethical and epistemological implications of the
practice of promising as they developed a new theory of contract.
In the equitable model of contract that prevailed in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the individual will played a fairly small role.
Then, as today, courts held people accountable for the performance of
their promises only when there was some reason or motivating circumstance for the promise, such as payment or other concrete benefit. In
the law’s terminology, a promise had to be accompanied by “consideration” in order to give rise to a legal obligation.6 When judges and
juries decided contract disputes during this period, they investigated
both whether there was a promise and whether the consideration
given in exchange for it was adequate. The consideration provided the
primary grounds for the obligation; if juries found the consideration
to be insufficient, they could refuse to enforce the agreement. Early
contract law thus left an opening for judicial discretion and communal
standards of fairness that imposed severe constraints on the kinds of
contractual relations that individuals could form.7
In the last few decades of the eighteenth century, jurists began to
replace this equitable theory of contract with a new theory grounded
in principles of individual freedom and autonomy.8 According to this
theory, obligations arose less from the existence of consideration and
more from the sheer will of the contracting parties. William Murray,
Lord Mansfield played a central role in developing the new doctrine.
During his tenure as Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench from
1756 to 1788, Mansfield issued several controversial rulings about the
role of promises in commercial contracts. Most famously, in Pillans and
Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins (1765), he declared that in commercial
cases among merchants, written promises could create legally binding
obligations without any accompanying consideration. He explained that
Melissa J. Ganz
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“the ancient notion about the [need for] consideration was for the sake
of evidence only,” and that when a promise was reduced to writing,
“there was no objection to the want of consideration.”9 Although judges
later rejected Mansfield’s extreme approach, they embraced the idea
that the basis of contractual liability is the intentions of the parties and
that the consideration serves primarily as evidence of those intentions.10
Over the course of the next hundred years, judges elaborated and developed this idea as they formulated the classical law of contract. The
principles of the marketplace provided the model for this new body of
law. When courts decided disputes between contracting parties, they
refused to consider the justice of the exchanges and refused to alter
the terms upon which the parties had agreed. Their role, they insisted,
was to enforce individual wills and intentions rather than communal
standards of fairness. Instead of scrutinizing a contract to determine
whether there was adequate consideration, judges now looked only
to see that there was a meeting of minds.11
Courts, however, quickly found themselves struggling with the difficult task of discerning subjective intent. By the middle of the nineteenth century, most judges had given up the effort and had adopted
an objective approach to contractual interpretation. Although judges
continued to view the subjective intentions of the parties as the legitimating basis for contractual obligations, they relied now upon objective
measures of those intentions.12 Much as moral philosophers such as
David Hume and Paley had insisted, courts held that an individual
could not avoid a duty that would otherwise attach to an external
manifestation of intention by pointing to some secret reservation. In
cases where the existence or interpretation of a contract was unclear,
judges evaluated only the parties’ words and actions.13
On occasion, as in the controversial case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus
(1864), courts relied upon the subjective meeting of minds standard to
resolve contract disputes, invalidating contracts when parties did not
understand key terms of the agreement in precisely the same way.14
Some treatise writers, such as Sir Frederick Pollock, also remained
committed to the subjective approach, insisting upon the importance
of a true consensus theory of liability. In Principles of Contract at Law
and in Equity (1876), for example, Pollock explained that contracting
parties “must be assured by mutual communication that a common
intention exists, that they mean the same thing in the same sense.”15
In a series of lectures and essays in the 1880s and 1890s, however,
the American jurist and philosopher Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. dealt
the subjective approach a final blow. “[Anglo-American contract] law has
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nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’ minds,” he famously
declared in The Common Law (1881). “In contract, as elsewhere, it
must go by externals and judge parties by their conduct.”16 In Holmes’s
view, subjective motivation was legally irrelevant; external behavior
trumped actual intentions and inner states of mind. Holmes elaborated
in “The Path of the Law” (1897):
Morals deal with the actual internal state of the individual’s mind, what
he actually intends. From the time of the Romans down to now, this
mode of dealing has affected the language of the law as to contract,
and the language used has reacted upon the thought. We talk about
a contract as a meeting of the minds of the parties, and thence it is
inferred in various cases that there is no contract because their minds
have not met; that is, because they have intended different things
or because one party has not known of the assent of the other. Yet
nothing is more certain than that parties may be bound by a contract
to things which neither of them intended, and when one does not know
of the other’s assent. . . . In my opinion no one will understand the
true theory of contract or be able even to discuss some fundamental
questions intelligently until he has understood that all contracts are
formal, that the making of a contract depends not on the agreement
of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of
external signs,—not on the parties’ having meant the same thing but
on their having said the same thing.17

Holmes’s account of contract law is both descriptive and prescriptive:
he not only reminds jurists that courts have been using an objective
approach to contractual interpretation for some time; he also insists
that they continue to use this approach. Underlying Holmes’s objection
to the idea of contract as a meeting of minds was a broader critique
of the way in which legal thinkers and laypeople alike “confound[ed]
morality with law.”18 A positivist, Holmes sought to keep ethics and
law—as well as promises and contracts—separate. In his view, there
was nothing morally significant about a contract; everyone had the
right “to break [a] contract if he [chose],” as long as he paid damages
to the other party for the breach.19 Holmes’s critique of the subjective
approach to contractual interpretation, though, ironically contributed
to the development of a doctrine that fostered accountability in contractual relations. By the first few decades of the twentieth century,
English and American courts had abandoned the attempt to discern
the actual intentions of parties in contract disputes. As a result, they
often undermined, rather than facilitated, the wishes of contracting
parties. Judges held people responsible for what they appeared to be
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saying and doing, rather than for what they actually meant to say or
do, and they considered what reasonable people would say or do if
they were in the same situation as the contracting parties. The formal,
external approach to contractual interpretation continues to underlie
Anglo-American law today.20
ii.

While nineteenth-century jurists worked out rules governing the
formation and interpretation of contracts, a diverse group of writers
and thinkers considered the implications of the proliferation of consensual agreements in society. The legal historian Sir Henry Sumner
Maine offered one of the most optimistic accounts of this change.
In his influential study, Ancient Law (1861), Maine traced a gradual
expansion of individual freedom in Roman civilization, as reflected
and furthered by an evolution in the law governing private obligations. Whereas responsibilities initially originated in the family, he
explained, individually negotiated promises and contracts eventually
came to form the basis of most social relations. This change in Roman
law, according to Maine, had far-reaching effects on Western culture.
In his famous phrase, “the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”21
The sociologist and apostle of Victorian liberalism Herbert Spencer
shared Maine’s conviction that this shift signified moral and social
improvement, but other observers were less optimistic.22 Social critics such as John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle and novelists such as
Charles Dickens considered the growth of market culture and the
accompanying expansion of the autonomous will as cause for alarm.
Rather than celebrate the new opportunities for human agency, they
criticized the market’s tendency to encourage impulsive, self-interested
behavior and they denounced the lack of constraints that society imposed on the individual will.23 In a period when many people thought
nothing of breaking their promises and contracts, critics worried that
consensual ties were too fragile to serve as structures for lasting social relations. In Our Mutual Friend (1864–1865), Dickens’s cynical
barrister Eugene Wrayburn expresses the spirit of the age when he
wryly observes that “people’s breaking promises and contracts and
bargains of all sorts, makes good for [his] trade.”24 In Eugene’s view,
breaches are not only routine; they are also desirable. The breaking
of agreements in the text serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of
the era’s individualistic ethos.
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Eliot shared these concerns. Like Dickens, she was keenly interested
in the growth of contract and the practice of promising. In fact, she read
Maine’s Ancient Law between 17 November and 1 December 1869,
and included summaries of each chapter of the work in a notebook
that she kept as she began writing Middlemarch.25 In the late 1860s
and 1870s, she also conversed with and read the work of philosophers
such as Austin and Sidgwick, who made important contributions to
the fields of analytical jurisprudence and the philosophy of mind, and
who considered, among other topics, the ethics of promising.26 Eliot’s
interest in moral and epistemological questions concerning promises
and contracts is also evident, though, a decade earlier, in The Mill on
the Floss.
Set in the early years of the nineteenth century, The Mill on the
Floss depicts the growth of the market in general and the proliferation
of contractual agreements in particular. From the promissory note
that Mr. Tulliver gives his brother-in-law and the loan that Mrs. Glegg
gives Mr. Tulliver, to the mortgage that Mr. Tulliver takes out on his
mill and the bill of sale that he gives an impatient creditor, contracts
form the basis of commercial relations in this novel. But Eliot is most
concerned with promises that arise outside the sphere of the market.
Through Maggie Tulliver’s relations with her father and brother as well
as with Philip Wakem and Stephen Guest, Eliot explores two different
views of the nature and purpose of promising—a narrow, self-regarding
view, embraced by Mr. Tulliver and Tom, and an expansive, other-regarding view, espoused by Maggie. Although Eliot acknowledges the
costs of the expansive approach, she ultimately affirms it. She suggests
that the basis for promissory liability lies in the expectations that one
raises in other minds, and that such expectations trump one’s actual
intentions.
In the face of bewildering social change and economic loss, the
hapless Mr. Tulliver uses promises to impose his will on others and to
ensure that they act according to his wishes. When Mr. Wakem obtains
possession of the Tullivers’ beloved mill, Mr. Tulliver becomes distraught; he declares his everlasting hatred for the lawyer and demands
that his son swear that he, too, will never forgive the man:
I won’t forgive him! . . . And you mind this, Tom—you never forgive
him, neither, if you mean to be my son. There’ll maybe come a time
when you may make him feel—it’ll never come to me—I’n got my
head under the yoke. Now write—write it i’ the Bible.27
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Maggie is horrified at the vindictive spirit that underlies her father’s
request. “It’s wicked to curse and bear malice,” she exclaims, in an attempt to prevent the recording of this pledge. But Mr. Tulliver remains
firm. “[W]rite—write as you’ll remember what Wakem’s done to your
father,” he commands his son, “and you’ll make him and his feel it, if
ever the day comes. And sign your name Thomas Tulliver” (MF, 236).
By insisting that Tom inscribe this pledge in the Bible, Mr. Tulliver
seeks to give it formal, religious sanction; he asks Tom, in effect, not
only to promise him but also to promise God. Tom’s willingness to
comply with this request eases Mr. Tulliver’s mind. He takes comfort
in knowing that, although he is unable to obtain revenge, his son may
do so for him. The pledge thus serves to lessen his feeling of defeat
and to bolster his sense of control over others.
Like his father, Tom uses promises to assert his will and to perpetuate conflict. Upon discovering that Maggie has secretly been meeting
Wakem’s son Philip alone in the Red Deeps, he demands that she
promise never to see Philip again:
Now, then, Maggie, there are but two courses for you to take; either
you vow solemnly to me, with your hand on my father’s Bible, that
you will never have another meeting or speak another word in private
with Philip Wakem, or you refuse, and I tell my father everything[.]
(MF, 300)

Tom’s request here echoes to that of his father. Like Mr. Tulliver,
Tom uses the Bible to shore up a pledge; he asks Maggie not only to
promise him but also to vow to God that she will never again meet
Philip in private. But where Tom willingly complies with his father’s
request, Maggie resents her brother’s attempt to restrict her actions.
She agrees to “promise . . . to give up all intercourse with Philip” but
insists that Tom permit her either to see Philip one last time or to
write to him so that she can explain the prohibition (MF, 300). Unlike
her brother and father, moreover, she insists on the binding nature of
a bare verbal promise. “If I give you my word, that will be as strong a
bond to me as if I laid my hand on the Bible,” she explains. “I don’t
require that to bind me.” Tom insists on this condition, however:
“Do what I require,” he orders. “I can’t trust you, Maggie. There is
no consistency in you” (MF, 300). Maggie submits to Tom’s demand
and lays her hand on the Bible, for she feels that she has no choice in
the matter: Tom is more powerful than she is and, in this instance, as
in so many others, she is forced to submit to his will. She alters the
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terms of the promise slightly, though: she gives her “word not to meet
[Philip] or write to him again without [Tom’s] knowledge” (MF, 301;
my emphasis). Still, this restrictive promise compromises Maggie’s
happiness, for it prevents her from freely communicating with the
one person in her narrow-minded society who shares her artistic, intellectual, and emotional sensibilities. The pledge makes explicit the
crushing conflict in Maggie’s life between her loyalty to her father and
brother and her affection for Philip.
Maggie’s understanding of the nature and purpose of promising
differs sharply from that of Mr. Tulliver and Tom. Whereas the latter
think of promises as formal obligations that serve to perpetuate their
wills, Maggie possesses a broader conception of promises that includes
all signs—written and spoken, witnessed and unwitnessed—that raise
others’ expectations concerning the existence of binding commitments.
Eliot introduces this broader view of promises early on in the novel,
when Maggie first meets Philip as a young child. Maggie admires
Philip’s intellectual prowess and artistic talent, and pities his physical
deformity. Before she leaves him, she kisses him and tells him, “I shall
always remember you, and kiss you when I see you again, if it’s ever
so long” (MF, 164). The narrator makes clear that Maggie construes
this declaration of her intended future conduct as a pledge. Several
years later, when she meets Philip again, the narrator explains that
Maggie “remember[s] her promise to kiss him, but, as a young lady
who ha[s] been at a boarding-school, she [knows] now that such a
greeting [is] out of the question, and Philip would not expect it” (MF,
165). The narrator’s remark provides important insight into Maggie’s
ideas about the practice of promising—ideas that Maggie will soon
articulate herself.
When Maggie next encounters Philip, their relationship becomes
complicated by the escalation of the dispute between their fathers.
During one of their first few meetings in the Red Deeps, Philip
declares his love for Maggie and reminds her of her promise to kiss
him. Maggie complies, but Philip notes that she does not seem happy.
He fears that she has told him that she loves him simply out of pity.
Maggie responds:
It is all new and strange to me; but I don’t think I could love any one
better than I love you. I should like always to live with you—to make
you happy. I have always been happy when I have been with you. There
is only one thing I will not do for your sake: I will never do anything to
wound my father. You must never ask that from me. (MF, 294)
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Maggie’s uncertain feelings for Philip (“I don’t think I could love any
one better than I love you”) sharply contrast with her absolute devotion
to her father (“I will never do anything to wound my father”). Maggie’s
hesitancy about their relationship troubles Philip. Before they part, he
seeks to obtain a more specific commitment from her. Her response,
though, remains ambiguous:
“Then my life will be filled with hope, Maggie—and
I shall be happier than other men, in spite of all? We do
belong to each other—for always—whether we are apart or
together?”
“Yes, Philip: I should like never to part: I should like
to make your life very happy.”
“I am waiting for something else—I wonder whether
it will come.”
	Maggie smiled, with glistening tears, and then
stooped her tall head to kiss the pale face that was full of
pleading, timid love—like a woman’s. (MF, 294–95)

Whereas Philip expresses his wishes clearly and forcefully, Maggie
dodges his attempt to secure a definite obligation. Rather than promise
to marry him or assure him that she intends never to part from him, she
articulates a series of desires concerning their relationship: “I should
like always to live with you”; “I should like never to part”; “I should
like to make your life very happy.” Philip himself notes the difference
between Maggie’s statements and the promise that he hopes to hear.
But the kiss that Maggie gives Philip at the end of this exchange at
once evokes her earlier pledge and suggests further reason for Philip
to believe that one day they might marry.
Several years later, after her father’s death, Maggie meets Philip
again, this time at the home of her cousin Lucy Deane. Philip asks
Maggie whether she wishes to forget their prior intimacy. “I desire no
future that will break the ties of the past,” Maggie replies. “But the tie
to my brother is one of the strongest. I can do nothing willingly that
will divide me always from him.” Philip inquires now, “with a desperate determination to have a definite answer,” whether that is the only
reason that would keep him apart from her forever. “The only reason,”
Maggie replies with “calm decision.” The narrator explains that, at this
moment, Maggie believes that her brother’s disapproval is, in fact, the
only thing that separates them; when she answers Philip’s question,
she “look[s] at the future with a sense of calm choice” (MF, 389). Yet,
as the novel has made clear, Maggie’s mind is hardly decided on this
question; she is certain neither about her feelings for Philip nor her
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intentions concerning marriage, for she finds herself growing attracted
to Stephen Guest, her cousin Lucy’s fiancé.
Through a series of heated exchanges between Maggie and Stephen, Eliot considers the question of whether Maggie is bound by
an implicit promise to marry Philip. The egotistical Stephen attempts
to persuade Maggie to forget Philip and to marry him instead, for
he cares more about indulging his present desires than honoring his
prior obligations. Maggie implores Stephen to “[t]hink of Lucy” (MF,
392), adding that there are “other ties . . . even if Lucy did not exist.” “I consider myself engaged to [Philip],” she explains, “—I don’t
mean to marry any one else.” Stephen responds by insisting that they
are justified in reneging on unwanted vows: “Maggie, if you loved me
as I love you,” he implores, “we should throw everything else to the
winds for the sake of belonging to each other. We should break all
these mistaken ties that were made in blindness, and determine to
marry each other” (MF, 393). In Stephen’s view, he and Maggie may
dissolve these other ties because they made them before they met and
fell in love. When this argument fails to convince Maggie, Stephen
modifies his position and suggests that they are not really bound by
any other ties in the first place:
“[A]fter all,” he went on, in an impatient tone, trying to defeat his
own scruples as well as hers, “I am breaking no positive engagement:
if Lucy’s affections had been withdrawn from me and given to some
one else, I should have felt no right to assert a claim on her. If you
are not absolutely pledged to Philip, we are neither of us bound.”
(MF, 393–94)

Here, as throughout the exchange, Stephen raises important questions about the moral claims of explicit and implicit promises and the
circumstances under which it is acceptable to break them, at least in
the context of marriage.28 But Maggie does not agree with Stephen’s
answers to these questions; in her view, both she and Stephen are
equally constrained, bound by prior commitments. “[T]he real tie lies
in the feelings and expectations we have raised in other minds,” she
insists. “Else all pledges might be broken, when there [is] no outward
penalty. There would be no such thing as faithfulness” (MF, 394).
Through Maggie’s disagreement with Stephen, Eliot intervenes in
a discussion among philosophers and jurists about the nature and extent of promissory obligation. In their treatises and lectures, ethicists
such as Paley, Austin, and Sidgwick examined the competing roles
of intentions and expectations in promissory obligations and, as we
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have seen, judges struggled with the question when deciding contract
disputes. The philosophers—who shared a broadly utilitarian frame
of mind—privileged the expectations of promisees over the actual
intentions of promisors.29 In The Principles of Moral and Political
Philosophy (1785), a copy of which Eliot owned, Paley maintained
that the obligation to honor promises “depends upon the expectations
which we knowingly and voluntarily excite.”30 Any action or conduct
towards another person that, one is sensible, “excites expectations in
that other,” he explained, “is as much a promise, and creates as strict
an obligation, as the most express assurances.”31 Austin, too, emphasized the importance of external manifestations of intention and the
expectations that they raise in other minds, although he sought to shift
the focus of the inquiry from the apprehension of the promisor to that
of both parties.32 Eliot’s friend Sidgwick similarly made expectations
the basis for his theory of promissory obligation. “[T]he essential element of the duty of Good Faith seems to be not conformity to my
own statement, but to the expectations that I have intentionally raised
in others,” Sidgwick would write in The Methods of Ethics (1874).33
In order to determine whether a person would be obliged to satisfy
expectations that he did not intend to create, Sidgwick would explain,
“[w]e form the conception of an average or normal man, and consider
what expectations he would form under the circumstances, inferring
this from the beliefs and expectations which men generally entertain
under similar circumstances.”34 Jurists, we remember, were formulating
similar rules in contract cases, albeit largely as a result of practical, as
opposed to moral, considerations.
In viewing herself as bound by a tacit engagement to Philip, Maggie embraces the position articulated by Paley, Austin, and Sidgwick
and adopted by most jurists in the middle of the century. Maggie feels
bound to Philip because she has raised his hopes that she may marry
him, even though she is not certain in her own mind that she wishes
to do so. Although Maggie succumbs to Stephen’s temptation and
permits him to carry her far down the river, alone in his boat, when
she realizes what she has done, she insists that Stephen take her back
to shore. Stephen declares that their situation proves that their feelings
for each other cannot be overcome. Maggie disagrees. “Faithfulness
and constancy mean something else besides doing what is easiest and
pleasantest to ourselves,” she insists. “They mean renouncing whatever
is opposed to the reliance others have in us. . . . I feel no excuse for
myself—none. I should never have failed towards Lucy and Philip as
I have done, if I had not been weak, selfish, and hard—able to think
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of their pain without a pain to myself that would have destroyed all
temptation” (MF, 417). Maggie here conflates her implicit promise to
Philip with Stephen’s explicit promise to Lucy; in her mind, they are
equally binding, for both Philip and Lucy rely upon their constancy
and suffer as a result of their infidelity. Through Maggie’s agonizing
decision to renounce Stephen and return to St. Ogg’s, Eliot underscores the costs involved in privileging Philip’s expectations over her
own desires, even as she suggests that Maggie is right to view herself
as bound to Philip.35
Eliot makes clear, though, that Philip ought to attend to Maggie’s
feelings and desires, just as she attends to his. After Philip learns of
Maggie’s aborted elopement with Stephen, he begins imaginatively
to place himself in Maggie’s position and acknowledges his mistake
in attempting to force her into an unwanted engagement. “Let no
self-reproach weigh on you because of me,” he writes to Maggie,
after she returns to St. Ogg’s. “It is I who should rather reproach
myself for having urged my feelings upon you, and hurried you into
words that you have felt as fetters.” When she first came back, he
explains, he shrank even from writing to her for fear of “thrust[ing]”
himself on her and thus “repeating [his] original error” (MF, 440).
Philip shows signs of an important change here. Unlike both Tom
and Stephen, he acknowledges his egotism and shows concern for
Maggie’s needs. Although he still affirms his love for her and declares
that he is “unchangeably [hers],” he insists that he is hers “not with
selfish wishes” (MF, 440, 441). In effect, he releases her from her
promise. Philip’s letter, though, comes too late. Maggie’s struggle to
find a balance between her own will and others’ wishes leaves her
emotionally drained.
Eliot is unable to imagine a way out of this impasse. In the last few
pages of the novel, she shifts her focus from these agonizing ethical
questions concerning the formation and dissolution of promises to
other equally troublesome issues concerning non-contractual, familial
ties. Throughout the text, Maggie emphasizes her duty to her father
and brother, reiterating her desire never to “break the ties of the past”
(MF, 389). This Burkean nostalgia for the unbreakable bonds of premodern society eventually replaces the novel’s concern with the ethical
dilemmas created by voluntary obligations. In his passionate response
to the destruction wrought by the French Revolution, Edmund Burke
used the image of the entailed estate to signify the unbreakable ties
between past and present generations.36 The feudal imagery evoked
his longing for the period before the growth of contract—a period
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marked by stability, constancy, and relative certainty in human relationships. In many ways, Eliot shares Burke’s view of the limits of
contractual ties. She alludes to Burke’s work in book 4 of the novel,
observing that “[t]he days of chivalry are not gone, notwithstanding
Burke’s grand dirge over them,” and, in the final pages of the text, she
imaginatively reconstructs Maggie’s original bond with her brother (MF,
250). Maggie’s tragic death underscores Eliot’s simultaneous investment in and critique of the indissoluble ties that structured social life
in the pre-modern era. Maggie’s desire to save Tom from the flood
ultimately causes her own demise, but Eliot is not able in this novel
to imagine a different solution to the problem of human relationships
in modern contractual culture.
iii.

In Middlemarch, Eliot revisits the ethics of promising, probing the
ways in which promises crystallize the tension between the individual
will and responsibilities to others. Eliot, we remember, read Maine’s
Ancient Law in the fall of 1869 during the early stages of her work on
this novel; Maine’s ideas seem to have left a deep impression on her
mind and her writing.37 She responds in this text with great ambivalence to the changes that Maine described. The egotism that pervades
Middlemarch society seriously complicates the practice of promising.
Like Mr. Tulliver and his son, Edward Casaubon and Rosamond Lydgate attempt to use promises to impose their wills on others and to
restrict others’ actions. Rosamond refuses to limit her own freedom,
though, by making pledges to other people. Unlike Maggie, she fails to
consider the expectations that she creates in other minds and refuses
to acknowledge such expectations as binding. Rosamond’s brother
and parents, by contrast, confuse wishful thinking with legitimate expectations; they read their own desires into others’ words and actions
and become convinced that others have bound themselves when the
latter have given clear indications to the contrary. In spite of these
problems, however, Eliot ultimately affirms the value and importance
of promissory obligations. Through Mary Garth’s relationship with
Fred Vincy, she holds out hope that promises can provide the basis
for strong human ties.
The difficulty of penetrating other minds becomes a central concern
early on in this novel. Although Dorothea Brooke’s erudite husband
Edward Casaubon cautions, “[w]e must not inquire too curiously into
motives,” he is obsessed and confounded by his inability to discern
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them.38 In an attempt to alleviate his anxiety about his wife’s feelings
for his young cousin, the aptly named Will Ladislaw, and in an effort
to restrict Dorothea’s freedom after he dies, Casaubon asks her to
bind herself with a promise. One night, Dorothea awakens to find
Casaubon sitting in a chair, eager to talk to her. He explains that he
has a “request to make”: “It is that you will let me know, deliberately,
whether, in case of my death, you will carry out my wishes: whether
you will avoid doing what I should deprecate, and apply yourself to do
what I should desire” (M, 448, 448–49). Dorothea struggles to decide
how to respond to this unusual request: “‘No, I do not yet refuse,’
said Dorothea, in a clear voice, the need of freedom asserting itself
within her; ‘but it is too solemn—I think it is not right—to make a
promise when I am ignorant what it will bind me to. Whatever affection prompted I would do without promising.’” Casaubon is not
satisfied with this answer. “But you would use your own judgment,”
he objects. “I ask you to obey mine; you refuse.” Horrified at the
thought of opposing her husband, Dorothea pleads for more time so
that she can “reflect a little while.” “I desire with my whole soul to
do what will comfort you,” she tells Casaubon, “but I cannot give any
pledge suddenly—still less a pledge to do I know not what” (M, 449).
The conflict between obeying her husband’s wishes and asserting her
own will deeply troubles Dorothea. She wishes to comply and yet she
wonders whether he “might . . . not mean to demand something more
from her than she had been able to imagine, since he wanted her to
pledge to carry out his wishes without telling her exactly what they
were” (M, 451). Dorothea senses, though, that she will not be strong
enough to resist and that she will eventually submit to her husband’s
demand: “she simply felt that she was going to say ‘Yes’ to her own
doom: she was too weak, too full of dread at the thought of inflicting
a keen-edged blow on her husband, to do anything but submit completely” (M, 452). Fortunately for Dorothea, Casaubon dies before
she is able to give her word.
By killing Casaubon before Dorothea can submit to his will, Eliot
makes clear that an “indefinite promise of devotion to the dead” is too
broad and exacting (M, 451). Like Tom Tulliver, Casaubon does not
know what it means to trust another human being; hence, he attempts
to control all of his wife’s future actions. The promise that Casaubon
seeks to secure from Dorothea would leave her frozen in the past. After
his death, Dorothea acknowledges that this would have been the case.
She places his unfinished “Synoptical Tabulation”—which he wanted
her to complete—in a sealed envelope in her desk drawer, along with
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a note. “I could not use it,” she writes to her dead husband. “Do you
not see now that I could not submit my soul to yours, by working
hopelessly at what I have no belief in?” (M, 506–7). In finally rejecting Casaubon’s request that she bind herself to his wishes and carry
out his fruitless work, Dorothea frees herself from the restrictive hold
of her husband’s “dead hand” (M, 403). Unlike Maggie, who submits
to her brother’s demands and binds herself with a promise that she
does not wish to make, Dorothea now asserts her own will. Through
Casaubon’s death, Eliot thus shows the importance of resisting others’
efforts completely to restrict one’s actions, highlighting the need to
retain the freedom to shape one’s own future.
Eliot suggests, however, that narrowly conceived promises can improve relationships by fostering accountability and limiting boundless
desire. Unlike Dorothea, Rosamond Vincy refuses to bind herself even
when she ought to do so. Instead, she repeatedly attempts to secure
promises from other people. When her husband, Tertius Lydgate,
discovers that she has gone horseback riding with his cousin, Captain
Lydgate, even though she is pregnant, he orders her to refrain from
riding again and declares that he will speak to his cousin about it.
Rosamond begs him not to talk to the captain. “It will be treating
me as if I were a child,” she objects. “Promise that you will leave the
subject to me.” As there “[does] seem to be some truth in her objection,” Lydgate begrudgingly complies with her request, and “thus
the discussion end[s] with his promising Rosamond, and not with
her promising him.”39 Lydgate’s willingness to consider Rosamond’s
concern contrasts with her refusal to look at the situation from his
point of view. Rosamond, the narrator tells us, “[is] determined not to
promise.” In her mind, what she “like[s] to do” is the “right thing” to
do, and she directs all of her energy to “getting the means of doing it”
(M, 549). Her love of horseback riding itself, of course, points to her
desire for freedom and mastery; her willingness to ride while she is
pregnant suggests her insensitivity to the wellbeing of anyone besides
herself. When she goes riding again, however, her horse takes fright
at the crash of a tree, and the resulting accident leads to the loss of
Rosamond’s baby. The death of the unborn child vividly underscores
the dangers that stem from her refusal to rein in her will.
Not surprisingly, Rosamond’s refusal to bind herself with promises
also contributes to the deterioration of her marriage. Rosamond becomes sullen and angry when Lydgate tells her that they will need to
cut back their expenses and move to a smaller house. Rosamond, in
fact, secretly contradicts Lydgate’s instructions and tells the auctioneer
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to take their house off of the market. Not only does Rosamond refuse
to give her word to Lydgate that she will never take such an action
again in the future, but she asks him to promise her not to put the
house back up for sale without telling her. “I think it is I who should
exact a promise that you will do nothing without telling me,” Lydgate
rejoins (M, 621). When he discovers, shortly afterwards, that she has
also secretly written to his uncle, asking for financial assistance on his
behalf, he becomes furious: “Can you not see . . . that nothing can be
so fatal as a want of openness and confidence between us?” he asks
her. “It has happened again and again that I have expressed a decided
wish, and you have seemed to assent, yet after that you have secretly
disobeyed my wish. In that way I can never know what I have to trust
to” (M, 626). Although Lydgate does not treat Rosamond as an equal
partner in their relationship—he believes that it is “for [him] to judge”
how they are to live, and for her simply to accept his decisions—he
shows a much greater willingness to consider her perspective than she
does his (M, 611). Lydgate’s inability to discern his wife’s intentions or
to rely upon her words and actions lies at the root of their disagreements. When Lydgate asks Rosamond to tell him that he can depend
upon her not acting secretly in the future, she replies that she “cannot possibly make admissions or promises in answer to such words as
[he] [has] used towards [her]” (M, 626). Unlike Casaubon’s demand
to Dorothea, the novel suggests, Lydgate’s plea to his wife is entirely
reasonable. Rosamond does not perceive the justness of Lydgate’s
request, for she refuses to step outside her own mental space and
view the world through others’ eyes. Rosamond repeatedly attempts
to use promises to restrict Lydgate’s actions even though, Eliot shows,
Rosamond ought instead to rein in her own desire.
Rosamond’s brother and parents evince a similar self-absorption.
Their unwillingness to consider other perspectives creates an additional
problem concerning the practice of promising: they read into others’
words and actions promissory intentions when the latter are not warranted, seeing what they wish to see and hearing what they want to
hear. Early on in the novel, a dispute arises when Peter Featherstone
hears a rumor that his nephew, Rosamond’s indolent brother Fred,
has been “speculating” on his “expectations” from his wealthy uncle
(M, 98). Most people in Middlemarch treat Fred as if he is special
because of his “tacit expectations” from Featherstone, and Fred’s
parents are no exception (M, 220); they assume that Featherstone
will eventually leave his property to their son. Mr. Vincy explains to
his brother-in-law that Featherstone “has as good as told Fred he
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means to leave him his land” (M, 119). Mrs. Vincy calls it a “robbery”
when Featherstone subsequently fails to act as they all expect him
to do. “[I]t was like giving him the land, to promise it,” she bitterly
declares, “and what is promising, if making everybody believe is not
promising?” (M, 322).
In this account of Fred’s anticipated inheritance, Eliot revisits the
question of the role of expectations in the formation of promissory
obligations, although this time she examines the problem from the
perspective of a potential promisee rather than a promisor. Fred’s
ideas about implied promises appear to be similar to those of Maggie
Tulliver. Maggie, we remember, insists that if people do not honor the
“feelings and expectations [that they have] raised in other minds . . .
all pledges might be broken” (MF, 394). Yet, whereas Maggie considers how Philip construes her words and actions, Fred never removes
his metaphorical blinders. Fred should know better; when he brings
Featherstone a letter written by the banker, Nicholas Bulstrode, stating the latter’s conviction that Fred “has not obtained any advance of
money on bequests promised by Mr. Featherstone,” Featherstone bursts
out, “promised? who said I ever promised? I promise nothing—I shall
make codicils as long as I like” (M, 124). Fred receives this explicit
warning that he should not expect to receive a bequest. Yet, instead of
heeding this notice, he continues to believe what he wants to believe,
ignoring Featherstone’s clearly articulated intentions. In this case, as
in so many others in the novel, Fred simply assumes that the outer
world correlates perfectly with his inner desires.
Mrs. Vincy’s ideas about Fred’s entitlement to the property are
similarly founded upon selfish desires rather than legitimate expectations. Her understanding of promissory obligations has the ring of
morality in it; it sounds like Paley’s definition of implied promises.40
But Mrs. Vincy’s expectations concerning Fred’s inheritance have no
more foundation than Fred’s do. Mrs. Vincy attempts to give moral
weight to wishful thinking, transforming unwarranted expectations into
binding obligations. Here again, the novel highlights the tendency for
people to see what they wish to see and to conflate their own desires
with others’ intentions, complicating the practice of promising.41
In the figure of Mary Garth, however, the novel holds out hope that
promises—even implicit ones—can provide the basis for strong social
ties. Fred has loved the daughter of the kind and humble Caleb Garth
ever since he was a child, and he desperately wishes to marry her. She
tells him, though, that she will never do so if he becomes a clergyman,
for she feels that he is singularly unsuited to that vocation. She makes
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Fred promise not to raise this subject with her again. Pressured by
his father to enter the church, Fred asks his friend and mentor, the
Reverend Camden Farebrother, to speak to Mary for him and to try
and determine whether he has any reason to hope that she will, in
fact, marry him if he gives up the profession for which he has been
educated. Fred’s appeal places Mr. Farebrother in an awkward position,
for he loves Mary himself. She perceives his feelings for her when he
implores her to tell him whether she could ever consider forming an
attachment with someone other than Fred. Her reply is decisive:
I have too strong a feeling for Fred to give him up for any one else. I
should never be quite happy if I thought he was unhappy for the loss
of me. It has taken such deep root in me—my gratitude to him for
always loving me best, and minding so much if I hurt myself, from
the time when we were very little. I cannot imagine any new feeling
coming to make that weaker. I should like better than anything to
see him worthy of every one’s respect. But please tell him I will not
promise to marry him till then: I should shame and grieve my father
and mother. He is free to choose some one else. (M, 486–87)

Mary here explicitly declares that she will not promise to marry Fred
until he makes himself worthy of others’ respect. In doing so, she
raises his expectations that she will marry him if and when he earns
that respect. As Mr. Garth puts it, Mary “has given [Fred] a sort of
promise according to what he turns out” (M, 531). In Mary’s relationship with Fred, then, Eliot rewrites the plot of The Mill on the Floss.
Unlike Maggie, Mary does not let her lover pressure her into forming
an engagement when she is not ready to enter it; she sets the terms
of their connection through her implied and conditional pledge.42 But
she knows that she has raised Fred’s expectations, and she is true to
them. Fred, in fact, relies upon her “sort of promise”; it inspires him
to work hard and to avoid diversions such as hunting and gambling.
Mary becomes, as it were, his conscience—the “impartial spectator”
within his breast.43 When Fred thinks of her and of her opinion of
him, he reins in his erring passion. Mary’s conditional pledge thus affects an important change in Fred: it gives him a reason to consider
someone’s perspective other than his own. At the end of the novel,
when Fred learns that his aunt has asked him to live at Stone Court
and to manage the land there for her, he tells Mary that he could be
“a tremendously good fellow . . . and [they] could be married directly.”
Aware of Fred’s failings, Mary coyly replies, “Not so fast sir; how do
you know that I would not rather defer our marriage for some years?
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That would leave you time to misbehave, and then if I liked some one
else better, I should have an excuse for jilting you” (M, 778). There
is, however, no real threat of such infidelity in this text. Unlike both
Maggie and Philip, and Lucy and Stephen, these lovers do indeed
marry and achieve “a solid mutual happiness” (M, 779).
iv.

In Daniel Deronda, Eliot develops and extends this optimistic portrait of promising. As in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch, in
this text, she expands the definition of promises to include all words
and actions that, one knows, raise others’ expectations concerning
the existence of binding obligations. Through her willful heroine,
Gwendolen Harleth, Eliot holds out hope that even egoists can come
to perceive the justice of this view of promising: Gwendolen eventually acknowledges the importance of attending to others’ perspectives
and accepts responsibility for breaking an implicit pledge. Eliot’s most
optimistic account of promising, though, appears in the novel’s Jewish
plot. In Daniel Charisi’s relationship with Joseph Kalonymos and in
the eponymous hero’s relationship with Mordecai Cohen, Eliot affirms
promises’ ability to provide continuity and stability in human relationships, and suggests that promises can both reflect and promote a true
meeting of minds.
Like Eliot’s other headstrong heroines, Gwendolen puts her own
needs above everyone else’s. Not surprisingly, she becomes fascinated
by the wealthy and imperious Henleigh Grandcourt. Unbeknownst
to Gwendolen, though, Grandcourt has already had an affair with a
married woman, Lydia Glasher. The death of Lydia’s husband, three
years earlier, prompted in Grandcourt “a vacillating notion of marrying
her, in accordance with the understanding often expressed between
them during the days of his first ardour.”44 However, Grandcourt grew
weary of her and refused to make her his wife. When Lydia learns of
Gwendolen’s intimacy with Grandcourt, she asks Gwendolen to meet
her in private. “I have promised to tell you something,” Lydia explains
when Gwendolen arrives. “And you will promise to keep my secret”:
My name is Lydia Glasher. Mr. Grandcourt ought not to marry any
one but me. I left my husband and child for him nine years ago. Those
two children are his, and we have two others—girls—who are older.
My husband is dead now, and Mr. Grandcourt ought to marry me. He
ought to make that boy his heir. (D, 189)
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Although Lydia insists that Grandcourt “ought to marry [her],” she
does not suggest that he promised to do so. She is more interested
in securing a pledge from her rival than in establishing the existence
of Grandcourt’s own vow. Horrified by the spectacle of this discarded
mistress and her young children, Gwendolen replies that she “will not
interfere with [Lydia’s] wishes” (D, 189). Gwendolen leaves her mother
and her uncle in Offendene and travels to Dover that afternoon to
avoid further temptation from Grandcourt. When Mrs. Harleth sends
her word that her bank has failed and that she and her daughters are
ruined, Gwendolen rushes back to Offendene, only to realize that she
will need either to marry Grandcourt or to become a governess in
order to help support her mother and her young siblings.
At the center of the novel is the question of whether Gwendolen
is morally bound by a promise to Lydia not to marry Grandcourt. The
question troubles Gwendolen. When Grandcourt sends her a letter,
expressing his desire to see her again, she knows that a “moment of
choice [has] come”:
[W]as it triumph she felt most or terror? Impossible for Gwendolen
not to feel some triumph in a tribute to her power at a time when she
was first tasting the bitterness of insignificance: again she seemed to
be getting a sort of empire over her own life. But how to use it? Here
came the terror. Quick, quick, like pictures in a book beaten open with a
sense of hurry, came back vividly, yet in fragments, all that she had gone
through in relation to Grandcourt—the allurements, the vacillations,
the resolve to accede, the final repulsion; the incisive face of that darkeyed lady with the lovely boy: her own pledge (was it a pledge not to
marry him?)—the new disbelief in the worth of men and things for
which that scene of disclosure had become a symbol. (D, 337)

Overcome by conflicting feelings and desires, Gwendolen at once
acknowledges and questions her promise to Lydia. Gwendolen is
similarly conflicted about her intentions concerning Grandcourt. She
“means” to refuse him and yet she gives him permission to visit her,
knowing that, as her mother puts it, he “will consider that [she has]
already accepted him, in allowing him to come” (D, 340). Although
Gwendolen is willful and selfish, she is not completely immoral. She
recoils from the idea of deliberately injuring anyone and has a “dread
of wrongdoing, which,” the narrator explains, “was vague, it is true,
and aloof from the daily details of her life, but not the less strong”
(D, 342). Gwendolen struggles to take hold of the situation in her
mind:
Melissa J. Ganz

585

[D]id she know exactly what was the state of the case with regard to
Mrs. Glasher and her children? She had given a sort of promise—had
said, “I will not interfere with your wishes.” But would another woman
who married Grandcourt be in fact the decisive obstacle to her wishes,
or be doing her and her boy any real injury? Might it not be just as
well, nay better, that Grandcourt should marry? For what could not a
woman do when she was married, if she knew how to assert herself?
(D, 342)

Gwendolen here briefly considers the moral obligation—the “sort of
promise”—that she is under. She shows some concern for Lydia’s welfare; she pauses to think about whether her own marriage to Grandcourt
would injure Lydia and her boy. But, unlike Maggie Tulliver and Mary
Garth, Gwendolen looks at the injury that would result from her breach
only from her own perspective. Lydia has already told Gwendolen that
she would feel deeply harmed if Gwendolen marries the man who
ought to become her husband; Gwendolen substitutes her own ideas
about the breach for Lydia’s clearly articulated feelings.
As Gwendolen continues to consider this question, she assumes
a different perspective. This time, she considers what a hypothetical
“‘anybody’ would say” (D, 342). This hypothetical “anybody,” however,
proves to be very different from the “average or normal” person to
whom philosophers and jurists alluded when deciding cases of ambiguous promises and contracts.45 Gwendolen’s “anybody” simply reflects
back her own desires. In Gwendolen’s view, “[t]he verdict of ‘anybody’
seem[s] to be that she had no reason to concern herself greatly on behalf
of Mrs. Glasher and her children.” Still, Gwendolen intends to refuse
Grandcourt’s proposal, for she feels great “indignation and loathing that
she should have been expected to unite herself with an outworn life,
full of backward secrets” (D, 343). But “[a]lmost to her own astonishment,” she feels a “sudden alarm at the image of Grandcourt finally
riding away”: “What would be left her then? Nothing but the former
dreariness. She liked him to be there” (D, 346). When he asks her
to become his wife, she is unable to let him go. After a considerable
pause, she accepts his proposal, the word “yes” coming “as gravely
from [her] lips as if she had been answering to her name in a court of
justice” (D, 348). The legal rhetoric here conveys the solemnity and
certainty with which Gwendolen responds to Grandcourt’s proposal;
Eliot suggests that Gwendolen knows what she is doing when she
accepts this offer of marriage and knows that her decision will have
serious moral consequences. The simile also suggests that Gwendolen
will be held accountable for her choice. Eliot imagines Gwendolen
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answering to her name in a court of law at the very moment that she
agrees to become Mrs. Grandcourt. The novel, in fact, hands down a
verdict that differs sharply from the one that Gwendolen hears in her
own mind: Eliot finds Gwendolen to have broken a binding vow.
Unlike Mr. Featherstone, who specifically tells his greedy nephew
that he does not promise to leave him any property, but like Maggie
Tulliver and Mary Garth, who knowingly raise their lovers’ hopes that
they will marry no one but them, Gwendolen is aware that she has
led Lydia to believe that she will refrain from marrying Grandcourt.
Although Gwendolen does not specifically use the word “promise” when
she assures Lydia that she will “not interfere” with her wishes, Lydia
herself uses the word twice at the beginning of their brief meeting,
suggesting that she understands the statements that they will exchange
to be similarly binding: “I have promised to tell you something. And
you will promise to keep my secret,” she declares when Gwendolen
arrives. Gwendolen agrees not to tell anyone about the meeting.
When Lydia prompts, “However you may decide, you will not tell Mr.
Grandcourt, or any one else, that you have seen me?” Gwendolen significantly replies, “I promise” (D, 189). Unlike in Maggie’s discussions
with Philip, then, the language of promising permeates this encounter.
Gwendolen herself, as we have seen, initially feels constrained by the
exchange; she considers herself under a “sort of promise,” even though
she proceeds to wriggle out of it (D, 342).
In the poetic justice that the novel metes out, Gwendolen suffers
for breaking her word. At Grandcourt’s request that Lydia return a
diamond necklace that he once gave her so that he may bestow it upon
his wife, Lydia tells him that she will send the diamonds directly to
Gwendolen. She encloses with them an angry and ominous note:
These diamonds, which were once given with ardent love to Lydia
Glasher, she passes on to you. You have broken your word to her, that
you might possess what was hers. Perhaps you think of being happy, as
she once was, and of having beautiful children such as hers, who will
thrust hers aside. God is too just for that. The man you have married
has a withered heart. . . . You will have your punishment. (D, 406)

As Lydia predicts, Gwendolen does indeed “have [her] punishment”
for breaking her word. Fittingly, as Gwendolen disregards Lydia’s feelings when she accepts Grandcourt’s proposal, she soon finds herself
married to a man who completely ignores her feelings. Although during their courtship, Gwendolen thinks that Grandcourt will be “less
disagreeable as a husband than other men, and not likely to interfere
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with [her] preferences,” he turns out to be even more willful and
imperious than she is (D, 147). Her determination to command him
proves futile; Grandcourt pays no heed to her wishes. In fact, early
on in their marriage, he breaks “the first promise [he] made [her],” a
promise never to bring his disturbing friend Lush into her presence
again (D, 626).
Through Gwendolen’s painful experience as well as through the
relationship that she forms with the novel’s eponymous hero, she
comes to understand the immorality of her action. As critics have long
noted, Deronda experiences a very different trajectory than Gwendolen does. Deronda’s “conscience include[s] sensibilities beyond the
common, enlarged by his early habit of thinking himself imaginatively
into the experience of others” (D, 570). Deronda articulates Eliot’s
central message: “Look on other lives besides your own,” he advises
Gwendolen. “See what their troubles are, and how they are borne.
Try to care about something in this vast world besides the gratification
of small selfish desires” (D, 501–2). Gwendolen eventually recognizes
the value of this advice. Through her conversations with Deronda,
she comes to understand the importance of trusting other people and
respecting their feelings and desires. Most significant, she admits that
when she married Grandcourt, she broke a promise to Lydia. Near
the end of the novel, after her husband drowns in a boating accident
for which she (wrongly) feels responsible, Gwendolen admits her guilt
to Deronda in a scene that reads as if she were speaking under oath
in a court of law:
I will tell you everything as God knows it. I will tell you no falsehood;
I will tell you the exact truth. What should I do else? I used to think
I could never be wicked. I thought of wicked people as if they were
a long way off me. Since then I have been wicked. I have felt wicked.
And everything has been a punishment to me. . . . Because—you
know—I ought not to have married. That was the beginning of it. I
wronged some one else. I broke my promise. I meant to get pleasure
for myself, and it all turned to misery. I wanted to make my gain out
of another’s loss[.] (D, 757)46

Gwendolen assumes the posture of defendant here, acknowledging
her culpability and accepting, as it were, a different verdict from the
one that she imagines earlier in the novel. Her candor and honesty
now contrast with her previous carelessness about the words that she
speaks and the impressions that she leaves upon other minds. She
finally understands the importance of attending to other people’s
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feelings and expectations, and recognizes the relationship between
her desires and others’ pain.
In the case of Gwendolen’s broken pledge, then, Eliot develops the
idea that she introduces in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch.
For Eliot, as for Paley, Austin, and Sidgwick in her own day and for
Stanley Cavell and Jan Narveson in our own, there is no clear distinction between a statement of intention and a promise. Statements of
intention can raise expectations and thus create binding obligations
just as explicit promises do.47 Eliot embraces this expansive definition
of promises because it straddles the internal and the external realms;
it gives weight to others’ expectations—but only those expectations
that one knowingly and voluntarily excites. Through this theory of
promising, Eliot seeks to foster an awareness of the ways in which
one’s words and actions affect other people.
v.

Although Eliot suggests that, in cases of conflict, the reasonable
expectations of promisees ought to take precedence over the actual
intentions of promisors, in Daniel Charisi’s relationship with Joseph
Kalonymos and in Deronda’s relationship with Mordecai, she affirms
that promissory obligations ought, ideally, to be marked by mutual
understanding and agreement. When people acknowledge and respect
each others’ feelings and needs, the novel suggests, promises can create
strong bonds, adding stability and continuity to relationships.48
The “solemn vow” that Deronda’s grandfather, Daniel Charisi, exchanges with Joseph Kalonymos as a young boy creates precisely such
a bond, at once reflecting and bolstering their friendship and loyalty to
each other (D, 788). Kalonymos explains that he and Charisi “solemnly
pledged . . . to help and defend each other to the last.” Although they
remained apart in later years, he tells Deronda, they never broke
this bond. Kalonymos eventually “fulfil[s] [his] pledge” by passing on
to Deronda a chest containing Charisi’s family records and religious
writings (D, 791). The chest becomes a literal embodiment not only
of the bond between the two friends but also of the link between the
living and the dead. The promise thus works to dissolve the physical
gulf between Charisi and Kalonymos, while enabling Charisi to convey
his legacy to his grandson.
Promises serve to bolster the loyalty and friendship between Deronda and Mordecai, too. In fact, they play an even greater role in this
relationship than in that between Charisi and Kalonymos. Mordecai
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admittedly overlooks Deronda’s feelings and wishes when they initially
meet, so absorbed is he in carrying out his own plans and goals. “You
must be not only a hand to me, but a soul—believing my belief—being moved by my reasons—hoping my hope—seeing the vision I point
to—beholding a glory where I behold it!” Mordecai exclaims when he
first sees Deronda (D, 557). Eliot emphasizes, however, that Deronda
chooses, of his own will, to embrace the role that Mordecai assigns
to him. After listening to and then participating in a debate about
Jewish nationalism at The Philosophers’ Club, Deronda realizes that
they share the same views on this question; only then does he begin
to feel “at one with this man who ha[s] made a visionary selection of
him” (D, 605). Eliot further signals the importance of Deronda’s assent
to Mordecai’s ideas through the handshakes that figure prominently
in their encounters. At the end of their first meeting, after Deronda
assures Mordecai that he will return at his first opportunity, Deronda
and Mordecai shake hands. This pact becomes the model for their
future encounters: their relationship builds around a series of implicit
promises, sealed with handshakes, signaling their trust in and fidelity
to each other.49 The promises underscore the importance of Deronda’s
consent; far from being a passive recipient of Mordecai’s commands,
Deronda is an equal partner in the relationship.
Like Gwendolen’s promise to Lydia, Deronda’s pledge to carry
out Mordecai’s work remains implicit. Yet, though Deronda never
uses the words, “I promise,” he makes it clear that he agrees with
Mordecai’s ideas and that he intends to devote his life to the cause of
Zionism. After Deronda discovers his own Jewish heritage, he explains
to Mordecai:
If this revelation had been made to me before I knew you . . . , I think
my mind would have rebelled against it. Perhaps I should have felt
then—“If I could have chosen, I would not have been a Jew.” What
I feel now is—that my whole being is a consent to the fact. But it
has been the gradual accord between your mind and mine which has
brought about that full consent. . . . Since I began to read and know, I
have always longed for some ideal task, in which I might feel myself the
heart and brain of a multitude—some social captainship, which would
come to me as a duty, and not be striven for as a personal prize. You
have raised the image of such a task for me—to bind our race together
in spite of heresy. . . . I mean to work in your spirit. (D, 819–20)

This statement of Deronda’s intended future action functions like a
promise; the narrator explains that Deronda’s “careful avoidance of pre
mature assent” gives to this “decided pledge of himself a sacramental
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solemnity, both for his own mind and Mordecai’s” (D, 820). Deronda
refrains from promising that he will embrace all of Mordecai’s ideas,
reserving, in particular, the right to think further about the kabbalah’s
doctrine of the merging of souls. “You must not ask me to promise
that. . . . I must be convinced first of special reasons for it in the writings themselves,” Deronda explains. “And I am too backward a pupil
yet. That blent transmission must go on without any choice of ours;
but what we can’t hinder must not make our rule for what we ought
to choose” (D, 820–21). In his reply, Mordecai signals his understanding of Deronda’s position and his recognition of the importance of
Deronda’s consent to this point. “I will ask for no promise till you see
the reason,” he declares. “[Y]ou shall judge” (D, 821).50 They have,
though, already reached an “accord” on other important points; both
Mordecai and Deronda are committed to creating a separate Jewish
nation, and Deronda pledges to carry on Mordecai’s work until he
achieves this end. Through her portrait of the promises that structure
the relationship between these two men, Eliot suggests the importance
of a true meeting of minds.
Not all late nineteenth-century thinkers shared Eliot’s optimism
about the ability of promises to connect individual consciousnesses and
to provide stability and continuity in relationships. Like Ruskin and
Carlyle earlier in the century, the French sociologist Emile Durkheim
viewed the growth of consensual agreements with chagrin. In The Division of Labour (1893), he would emphasize the limits of “contractual
solidarity” in modern society:
[I]f mutual interest draws men closer, it is never more than for a few
moments. It can only create between them an external bond. In the
fact of exchange the various agents involved remain apart from one
another and once the operation is over, each one finds himself again
“reassuming his self” in its entirety. The different consciousnesses are
only superficially in contact: they neither inter-penetrate nor do they
cleave closely to one another. Indeed, if we look to the heart of the
matter we shall see that every harmony of interests conceals a latent
conflict, or one that is simply deferred. For where interest alone reigns,
as nothing arises to check the egoisms confronting one another, each
self finds itself in relation to the other on a war footing, and any truce
in this perpetual antagonism cannot be of long duration. Self-interest is,
in fact, the least constant thing in the world. . . . Thus such a cause can
give rise only to transitory links and associations of a fleeting kind.51

This passage vividly conveys the selfishness and anomie that permeate market society, while underscoring the ways in which contractual
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exchanges foster these feelings of disconnection. Deronda’s relationship with Mordecai provides a sharp contrast to this bleak picture of
self-interested agreements. Far from being locked in conflict, Deronda
and Mordecai lovingly embrace each other; their consciousnesses interpenetrate, as they articulate and agree upon the same ideas and goals.
The differences between Eliot’s and Durkheim’s portraits of consensual agreements should not surprise us when we consider that, unlike
Durkheim, Eliot depicts relationships that arise outside the realm of
the market. Eliot agrees with the jurists who consolidated classical
contract law in this period insofar as she affirms the importance of a
meeting of minds. Yet, unlike the jurists, who embraced the values
of the marketplace and celebrated individual freedom even—and, in
fact, precisely—when it resulted in unequal bargains, Eliot endorses
relationships that are founded upon real trust and consent. By contrast
with the tenuous and self-interested ties that Ruskin, Carlyle, and
Durkheim perceive at the heart of commercial exchanges, and by
contrast with the coercive bonds that Eliot’s egoists attempt to impose
on others in The Mill on the Floss and Middlemarch, the promises
that bind Deronda and Mordecai are marked by mutual concern and
respect. Each person shares the other’s goals and values the other’s
feelings and wishes. In the bond between these friends, Eliot offers
a utopian vision of the practice of promising.52
In Eliot’s utopian vision, promises also serve as the basis for national communities. Deronda and Mordecai seek to bring together
the Jewish people who are currently “scattered over the face of the
globe” (D, 875) in order to give them a sense of “hearty kindred and
fellowship” (D, 587). At the center of their vision lies a “national covenant” (D, 591) that will bind “[the] race and its families in dutiful
love” (D, 590). This covenant fuses the best aspects of pre-modern
bonds with those of modern, contractual obligations. As in The Mill
on the Floss, Eliot emphasizes the importance of stability, cohesion,
and kinship; but now she suggests that these goals can be achieved
through voluntary ties.53
Eliot’s most hopeful and vivid portraits of promising, however, are
limited in an important respect: they depict only pledges between
men. For men alone—deeply sensitive and devout men, in particular—promises serve to reflect and promote a meeting of minds. The
novel itself calls attention to the contrast between Deronda’s bond
with Mordecai and his pledges to Mirah and Gwendolen. Compared
to Deronda’s lengthy and passionate discussions with Mordecai, his
exchanges with Mirah are brief and reserved. Whereas Deronda and
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Mordecai openly share their feelings and aspirations, Deronda remains
emotionally distant from Mirah, uncertain of her feelings for him. “Say
you will not reject me,” he implores her at last. “Say you will promise
to be my wife—say it now. I have been in doubt so long—I have had
to hide my love so long” (D, 863). Tellingly, we do not hear Mirah’s
reply, for she is not an equal partner to this contract. The promises that
Deronda exchanges with Mordecai create a bond that does not threaten
either of their separate identities. The veil that covers Mirah’s face
when she exchanges her “mutual pledge” with Deronda, by contrast,
calls attention to the way in which her identity becomes covered over
and absorbed into that of her husband (D, 880).
Deronda’s pledge to Mordecai similarly differs from his promise
to Gwendolen. After Gwendolen confesses to Deronda her guilty
feelings about her husband’s death, Deronda attempts to comfort
her, prompting Gwendolen to declare her need for and dependence
upon him. “You must not forsake me,” she insists. “I will bear any
penance. I will lead any life you tell me. But you must not forsake
me. You must be near. If you had been near me—if I could have said
everything to you, I should have been different. You will not forsake
me?” Gwendolen here attempts to impose a capacious obligation
on Deronda. He hedges his reply, indirectly expressing his desire to
comply with her request: “It could never be my impulse to forsake
you,” he assures her. Deronda, of course, knows that he will not be
able to remain near Gwendolen much longer; he perceives that “to
her ear his words might carry a promise which one day would seem
unfulfilled: he was making an indefinite promise to an indefinite hope”
(D, 765). Still, Deronda intends to honor his pledge. When he tells
Gwendolen of his imminent journey east, he explains, “We shall not
be quite parted. . . . I will write to you always, when I can, and you
will answer?” (D, 878). Deronda’s promise never to forsake Gwendolen—shored up by this additional, more specific pledge to write to
her whenever he can—provides some security and stability in their
relationship; it ensures that they will remain in contact in spite of the
great distance that will separate them.
This pledge, though, neither reflects nor promotes a meeting of
Deronda’s and Gwendolen’s minds. Eliot takes pains to emphasize the
miscommunication that marks the making of the promise: Deronda’s
“voice, like his eyes,” we learn, “ha[s] the unintentional effect of making his ready sympathy seem more personal and special than it really
[is]” (D, 765). Gwendolen, in short, reads more into this pledge than
Deronda intends. Later on, when Deronda tells Gwendolen of his
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imminent departure, he attempts to comfort her by suggesting that,
through their correspondence, he will “be more with [her] than [he]
used to be.” Similarly, he holds out the hope that, though they may
never see each other again, their “minds may get nearer” (D, 878).
These possibilities, though, seem rather remote, given the disparate
spheres that they occupy and the different lenses through which they
view the world.54 Up until the final pages of the text, Gwendolen, in
fact, remains completely ignorant of the “separateness of [Deronda’s]
life” (D, 867). When she, at last, gains a glimpse of it, she experiences
a profound change in perspective: she “feel[s] the pressure of a vast
mysterious movement . . . and get[s] a sense that her horizon [is] but
a dipping onward of an existence with which her own [is] revolving”
(D, 876). Yet Gwendolen’s mental world nonetheless remains distant
from Deronda’s. Gwendolen possesses little knowledge of Deronda’s
feelings and needs; nor does she understand his intellectual and
spiritual commitments. Unlike Deronda’s pledge to Mordecai, which
reflects and promotes their shared ideas and goals, Deronda’s promise
to Gwendolen does not foster real understanding between them. In
this novel, Eliot ultimately holds up a genuine accord as central to
the practice of promising and yet suggests that such an accord is, in
practice, limited to the minds of men.
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